Are Judges Morally Obligated to Obey the Law
by Jeffrey Brand-Ballard
[This is excerpted from Dr. Brand-Ballard's forthcoming book, Limits of Legality]
Introduction
As a conscientious moral agent, a judge in a court of law often finds herself in a difficult
position. She is confident that the law requires a certain result in the case before her, but she is at
least as confident that this legally required result is unjust or otherwise morally objectionable.
Consider some examples of cases in which a reasonable judge might consider herself to be in this
position:
The law of landlord and tenant can require a judge to evict an impoverished, elderly
widow from her apartment for missing rent payments...
A student in a poor school district sues his state for providing a much lower caliber of
education than students receive in wealthier districts. Binding legal precedent requires the judge
to dismiss the student's lawsuit.
Binding precedents construing the Fourth Amendment require judges to exclude
evidence obtained without a search warrant. As a result, a child molester is acquitted, and,
predictably, strikes again.
"Three strikes and you're out" statutes have required judges to sentence convicts to life
in prison without parole for committing third felonies that are non-violent, such as stealing golf
clubs or videotapes.
Federal sentencing laws specify mandatory minima that have forced judges to give
twenty-year prison terms to the wives and girlfriends of men who deal drugs out of the home,
without evidence that the women were much involved in the business.
One could define these moral dilemmas out of existence by insisting that any result
required by positive law is, by definition, morally acceptable. This would involve biting the
bullet and agreeing that slavery and genocide are moral wherever positive law requires them.
Alternatively, one could deny that positive law, properly understood, ever requires slavery,
genocide, or other immoral results. Readers who take either of these positions will have no
interest in this paper.
For the rest of us, court cases such as these raise the question whether judges are morally
obligated to apply the law. We might hope to gain insight into this question by consulting the
hundreds of philosophical discussions of the duty to obey the law. Many contemporary
philosophers have defended philosophical anarchism - the position that we have no moral duty
to obey the law, just because it is the law.2 Although there are prominent defenders of the duty
to obey, anarchism is now a mainstream position, and arguably the dominant one.
Disappointingly, almost all of these discussions concentrate on private parties deciding
whether to obey. They largely neglect to ask about public officials, including judges. Steven Smith notes that "[a]lthough everyone assumes that courts normally have a duty to follow duly-
enacted statutes, it is curious that hardly anyone bothers to articulate the basis of that duty." ["Why Must Courts Obey the Law?" Geogrgetown Law Journal, 77:113-164, 113.]
Even the most radical anarchists never deny that presiding judges have a duty to apply and
enforce the law in their decisions. Nor have the defenders of a general duty to obey often
bothered to extend their conclusions to judges, although perhaps they have assumed that the
extension is obvious. This neglect of the judiciary must frustrate anyone who wants to know
how judges should decide cases in which law and morality appear to conflict.
In this paper, I evaluate critically several arguments in favor of a judicial duty to apply
the law, and present what I think is a better argument for that duty. My argument has some
unexpected implications. It implies that, when the judicial duty to apply the law competes with
other moral reasons, it does not prevail as consistently as one might expect. A viable argument
for giving the duty some weight also supports an argument against giving it as much weight as
many have wanted to give it. I conclude that judges' moral reasons to disregard the law can be
decisive more often than most writers have assumed.
The Duty to Obey the Law
First, I shall explain what philosophers mean by "a duty to obey the law." They don't
mean a legal duty. That one has a legal duty to fulfill one's overall legal duties is tautological.4
A private party can have legal grounds for disobeying a particular law, as when one faces a state
law that conflicts with federal law. However, that's just to say that his overall legal duty is to
violate the state law for the sake of the federal, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
The duty to obey the law is not a legal duty, but a moral duty. However, it is not a
conclusive or all-things-considered moral duty, but one that can be overridden by other
considerations. W.D. Ross called it a "prima facie duty,"5 although I shall follow contemporary
writers who call it a pro tanto duty.6 We have no all-things-considered moral duty to obey a
horrendously unjust statute. Parents have no duty to injure their children, even if the law
requires them to do so. Even if one has a pro tanto duty to obey the law, one's natural duty not
to injure human beings would at least override, if not undermine it, in that situation.
How is the moral duty to obey the law relevant for judges? Of course, judges are also
private citizens, so whatever duty to obey the law may exist, it has its ordinary relevance for
them as they walk downtown and shop for groceries. That's not my concern. I'm interested in
the relevance of the duty for judges, qua judges - judges in their professional capacities.
Rules of Adjudication
In modern legal systems, the professional duties of judges are specified in certain
secondary legal rules, which H.L.A. Hart calls rules of adjudication.7 These duties include
appearing in court, supervising courtroom proceedings, hearing evidence and argument,
researching the law, deliberating about cases, writing opinions, et cetera. Unlike the rest of us,
judges have a legal duty to perform these functions. The next question is: do they have a pro
tanto moral duty to do their legal duty?
As mentioned, many philosophers have concluded that private parties have no pro tanto
moral duty to obey the law. One might suppose that such a conclusion entails that judges have
no pro tanto moral duty to obey adjudication rules. But most philosophers in this area seem to
reject that inference. To determine whether they're correct, we must examine the conclusions defended by philosophical anarchists. Many are merely concerned to deny a completely general
duty to obey the law - one that applies to everyone just in virtue of his physical presence within
a jurisdiction. These anarchists don't deny that certain individuals, in certain capacities, have
duties to obey the law. Perhaps that includes judges.
I shall now examine some arguments for a general duty to obey and consider whether
they might support a judicial duty to obey adjudication rules. ...
The Judicial Oath
A classic ... argument for a duty to obey the law is the argument from actual
consent. This argument is famously problematic as applied to natural-born citizens, most of
whom never give actual consent to the state.8 However, the argument applies straightforwardly
to judges. Judges in most legal systems swear a public oath to uphold the law. An oath either
implies or constitutes a promise, and promises create duties. There are familiar defeating
conditions, but these conditions are absent when judges take their oath of office. There is no
duress or coercion, for example. Judges always have reasonable alternative occupations.
Therefore, the oath gives judges a pro tanto moral duty to obey adjudication rules.
A promise can override or undermine reasons of prudence, preference, and partiality.
Judges often have prudential reasons to disobey adjudication rules. For example, many judges
would prefer playing golf to appearing in court, and they could make good money by practicing
law on the side. However, adjudication rules forbid them to do either of these things, and their oath gives them a strong moral reason to obey the rules. This reason at least overrides (and
probably undermines) judges' reasons of prudence, preference, and partiality. Therefore, judges
have all-things-considered moral reasons not to skip trials or practice law on the side.
The fact that judges take an oath may explain why philosophers have not thought it
necessary to defend judicial duties. It seems too easy!
The Adherence Duty (the Duty to Apply the Law)
My main concern, however, is not with the judge's duty to appear in court or to refrain
from practicing law, or anything like that. I'm interested in his duty to apply the law correctly. I
call this adhering to the law, to distinguish it from the generic concept of obeying the law. The
opposite of adhering I shall call deviating from the law...
Codes of judicial conduct typically state that "judges shall be faithful to the law." These
codes are incorporated by statute into adjudication rules, giving judges at least a pro tanto legal
obligation to apply the law. Let me be clear what this means. I'm not saying that judges face
legal sanctions for misapplying the law in their decisions. In fact, judges aren't fined or
incarcerated, or even subjected to judicial discipline, for deviating from the law. Nor are they
subject to civil damage awards.10 People are often surprised to learn that judges aren't disciplined for misapplying the law, but only for judicial misconduct, which is limited to things
like criminal activity, sexual harassment, conflicts of interest, and intoxication on the job.
Misconduct is not legally defined to include deviation from the law. So a judge's incentive to
adhere to the law may be weaker than a private party's incentive to obey the law. Nevertheless, I
suggest that adjudication rules give judges a legal duty to apply the law. Since H.L.A. Hart,
legal theorists have recognized that the law can impose genuine legal duties without sanctions,
just as it can grant legal powers without any sanctions being involved at all.
So adjudication rules give judges a legal duty to apply the law. If judges have a moral
duty to obey adjudication rules, then they have a moral duty to apply the law. The stronger their
moral duty to obey adjudication rules, the stronger their moral duty to apply the law...
If my only goal were to defend the claim that judges sometimes have a pro tanto moral
duty to apply the law, then my task would be complete. However, I have yet to ask how this pro
tanto duty interacts with a judge's other moral reasons, as opposed to her prudential reasons. It
is widely recognized that a promise does not attenuate one's other moral duties, and that other moral reasons can undermine or override reasons generated by promises. I suggest that the same
principle applies to oaths. Bruce has a natural duty not to inflict gratuitous pain on animals. He
gets on the radio and swears a solemn oath before his fellow citizens that he will kick his dog on
Saturday. Most people would agree that taking this oath gives Bruce no reason whatsoever to
kick his dog, and does not attenuate his reason to refrain from doing so. Bruce's natural duty
undermines whatever reasons his oath might otherwise have given him.
A new question now arises: do judges' moral reasons to deviate from the law ever
override or undermine their reasons to adhere?
Optimal Versus Suboptimal Results
In order to answer this question, I must distinguish between optimal-result cases and
suboptimal-result cases. A suboptimal-result case is one in which the controlling legal authority
requires the judge to rule in favor of a certain party, although she would otherwise have an all-
things-considered moral reason to rule against that party, ceteris paribus. All other cases are
optimal-result cases.
the philosopher's distinction between "justice" and "injustice." To evaluate my arguments, you
need only be prepared to distinguish, for yourself, between optimal and suboptimal results. We
need not agree regarding the proper classification of any particular result. The cases described at
the beginning of this paper were intended as plausible examples of suboptimal-result cases. For
illustrative purposes, I shall now add some details to one of these cases. Mary is an
impoverished widow who is renting an apartment from Mike, a wealthy landowner who inherited
the property and has never worked a day in his life. Mary has missed several rent payments, and
Mike has filed an eviction petition before Judge Jack. I stipulate that Mary is morally innocent. She is too old and frail to work, and her pension does not cover her rent. Neither retributive nor
corrective justice requires a judgment against Mary. She has done nothing to deserve eviction.
Nor does Judge Jack violate anyone's moral rights if he rules for Mary. That decision violates
Mike's legal rights, but Mike was not morally entitled to Mary's rent in the first place, absent the
law. Nor will Mary's eviction maximize the combined utility of Mary and Mike, as Mary needs
her apartment more than Mike needs her money. If the law did not require eviction, then Judge
Jack would have an all-things-considered moral reason to deny Mike's petition. However, the
regulating statute requires him to grant it, thereby evicting Mary. I'm using this as an example
of a suboptimal-result case, but again, my point is not to persuade you that evicting Mary is
definitely a suboptimal result. You can imagine some other case, if you prefer, one in which the
law requires what you consider to be a suboptimal result.
Bearing in mind the distinction between optimal-result and suboptimal-result cases, I
shall now reexamine the judge's duty to apply the law. If Judge Jack grants Mike's petition, then
he commands the sheriff to force Mary from her apartment. No one, with the possible exception
of Jack, has an all-things-considered moral reason to command anyone to do this to Mary.
Indeed, everyone else has a strong pro tanto moral reason not to do so. If the law did not require
it, then even Jack would have an all-things-considered reason not to do it.
I suggest that, just as Bruce's oath gives him no reason that competes with his natural
duty to refrain from kicking his dog, likewise Judge Jack's oath to uphold the law gives him no
reason that competes with his natural duty to deny the eviction petition...
Systemic Effects
The prospective arguments which seem the most promising to me are those that appeal to
certain negative effects of patterns of judicial deviation from the law. I call these systemic
effects. These are the effects that patterns of deviation have on the choices made by other legal
actors, especially the choices made by judges in future cases. Arguments from systemic effects
can support an adherence duty that applies in suboptimal-result cases because judicial deviation
has systemic effects in both optimal-result and suboptimal-result cases.
Systemic effects fall into two categories: adaptation effects and mimetic effects. I start
with adaptation effects. Suppose Judge Jack rules for Mary, despite the fact that the law requires
him to rule for Mike. People may notice Jack's deviation. Journalists may report that Judge
Jack has disregarded the law. Practicing lawyers and scholars may criticize him. Ultimately,
news of this verdict might lead landlords to lower their estimates of the likelihood of winning
lawsuits against delinquent tenants. This change could, in turn, lead landlords to raise rents, or to
require better credit from prospective tenants.
A special form of adaptation occurs when judges attempt to imitate one another.14 Let us
assume, first, that deviation encourages deviation. In unfortunate situations, deviation, even in
suboptimal-result cases, encourages misguided judges to deviate in optimal-result cases, perhaps
mistaking them for suboptimal-result cases. I call this mimetic failure. Mimetic failure
constitutes an adherence reason that applies in both optimal-result and suboptimal-result cases.
However, there are countervailing reasons. Just as deviation encourages deviation,
adherence encourages adherence. Adherence by judges in optimal-result cases can encourage
misguided judges to adhere in what are actually suboptimal-result cases.
In light of the apparent parity between deviation and adherence, so far, how might one
defend a presumption in favor of adherence? One might conjecture that the probability that a
deviant decision will induce deviation in optimal-result cases is greater than the probability that
an adherent decision will induce adherence in suboptimal-result cases. But I see no reason to
accept this conjecture.
Instead, I suggest appealing to the fact that parties can plan for judicial adherence in
suboptimal-result cases more effectively than they can plan for judicial deviation in optimal-
result cases. Adherence in a suboptimal-result case is suboptimal, overall, but at least it does not
frustrate the loser's reasonable expectations. Whereas, deviation in an optimal-result case is
suboptimal, overall, and also frustrates the loser's expectations. Therefore, insofar as deviation
encourages deviation in optimal-result cases, systematic reasons favor adherence over deviation, even in suboptimal-result cases. This argument does not depend on the dubious premise that the
extent to which deviation encourages deviation in optimal-result cases is greater than the extent
to which adherence encourages adherence in suboptimal-result cases.
The Objection from Magnitude
I believe that systemic effects provide the most important reasons for judges to adhere to
the law in suboptimal-result cases. However, I must confront some objections to this thesis.
One objection concerns the fact that a single deviant decision typically has no perceptible
systemic effects. Only in extraordinary cases will there be a non-party who is adversely affected
by a deviant decision, as such. The causal relations between a deviant decision and its systemic
effects are diffuse, rather than concentrated.
If an action has no perceptible effects, then its effects can't constitute reasons for or
against performing it. This fact is especially significant, for my purposes, because the immediate
effects of an adherent decision are typically substantial, as compared to the systemic effects of a
deviant decision. The judge who adheres to the law in a suboptimal-result case substantially
disadvantages the losing party, and often other identifiable individuals. Of course, adherence
also benefits the victorious party, but in suboptimal-result cases the winner almost always
benefits less than the loser suffers. So the objection from the magnitude of systemic effects has
great urgency for anyone who opposes a policy of consistent deviation in suboptimal-result cases,
as do most writers on the subject.
...
One response to the objection from magnitude involves accepting the existence and moral
significance of imperceptible harms. One can then assert that a deviant decision inflicts
imperceptible harm on the legal system as a whole, despite its lack of perceptible effects on identified individuals... A second way to respond to the objection from magnitude is to treat each deviant
decision as imposing a risk of substantial harm... Any deviant decision could, potentially, function as a trigger. However, very few deviant
decisions directly cause subsequent deviation in optimal-result cases. Any given deviant
decision runs only a miniscule triggering risk...
The important point is that these reasons are too weak to prevail in many suboptimal-
result cases... judges in suboptimal-result cases pose a much more
difficult puzzle because they have strong pro tanto moral reasons to deviate. We are trying to
explain why they might nevertheless have an all-things-considered moral reason to adhere. Theories based on triggering risks or imperceptible harms provide reasons of the right kind, but
these reasons are too weak to serve this purpose.
Consider, by analogy, the fact that administering a vaccination subjects the patient to a
small risk of death. This risk gives the doctor a reason not to administer the vaccine, but this
reason is weak. Of course, if the vaccine serves no medical purpose, then this weak reason
becomes an all-things-considered reason not to administer it. But if the vaccine will reduce the
risk of disease then the doctor has a pro tanto reason to administer it, which can override the
opposing reason and generate an all-things-considered reason to do so...
Similarly, the negative effects of adherence, on the losing party and others, are often
direct and substantial, in suboptimal-result cases. I suggest that the adherence reasons generated
by systemic effects are rarely strong enough to override the judge's natural duty to deviate, in
these cases, so they don't generate an all-things-considered reason to adhere.
Participation
So, I've still not identified a reason to adhere that is strong enough to override or
undermine the reason to deviate in some suboptimal-result cases. What we need, I think, is a
theory of participatory reasons or complicity.
Suppose Judge Jack deviates consistently in suboptimal-result cases. If other judges also
deviate consistently in such cases, then they participate in a collective practice of consistent
deviation in suboptimal-result cases. One could argue that Judge Jack intentionally participates in this collective enterprise. Is he therefore responsible for the effects of the enterprise, as a
whole? He is, according to a moral principle defended recently by Christopher Kutz, called the
Complicity Principle. The Complicity Principle holds that
"one is accountable for what others do when one intentionally participates in the wrong
they do or harm they cause. One is accountable for the harm or wrong that one does
together with others, independently of the actual difference one makes." [Kurtz, p.122]
The Complicity Principle holds individuals accountable for driving a car that emits
greenhouse gases in quantities too small to register, on the global scale. It also entails that a
merchant acts immorally if he indifferently provides tools to criminals, even if the tools are
widely available elsewhere. These actions make no difference to outcomes, but the Complicity
Principle holds the agents accountable, nonetheless.
Similarly, the Complicity Principle links deviant decisions to the systemic effects of
deviation patterns. If Judge Jack deviates in suboptimal-result cases, then he joins a collective
enterprise with every other judge who deviates at least as often as he does. According to the
Complicity Principle, he is accountable for more than the systemic effects of his individual
contribution. He is accountable for the effects of the enterprise as a whole. Its effects give him
reasons. An enterprise of frequent deviation in suboptimal-result cases encourages misguided
judges to deviate in some optimal-result cases. According to the Complicity Principle, Jack is
responsible for the unjustified deviation caused by this enterprise, even though he never deviates,
himself, in optimal-result cases, and he contributes only minimally to the enterprise that causes
other judges to deviate, unjustifiably. The reasons generated by the effects of this enterprise may
be strong enough to override the pro tanto reason to deviate generated by Jack's other natural
duties, the ones that require him to reach morally optimal results.
Free Riding
My application of the Complicity Principle remains incomplete, however. Suppose the
aggregate level of deviation in Jack's legal system is so low that there is no collective harm in
which Jack participates. Is it wrong, nevertheless, for Jack to deviate more frequently than his
fellow judges do, in suboptimal-result cases? ...
By deviating consistently in suboptimal-result cases, Judge Jack avoids directly inflicting
unjustified disadvantages on legally disfavored parties. He keeps his "hands clean," as the
expression goes. However, as we have just seen, if other judges were to follow Jack's policy,
then he would become complicit in a harmful collective practice of consistent deviation in
suboptimal-result cases. If, by contrast, the other judges adhere in suboptimal-result cases, then
they thereby inflict unjustified disadvantages themselves. Therefore, it is only because other
judges generally adhere, in suboptimal-result cases, that Jack has the option of deviation without
the taint of complicity.20 He rides free on judges who deviate less frequently than he. Jack
wipes his hands clean, but he wipes them on the hands of his fellow judges.
I suggest that, when pro tanto impermissible actions must be performed, there is a reason
to distribute these actions evenly across agents who are disadvantaged by performing them, just
as with any other unpleasant task that must be performed.
A judge who deviates less than consistently in suboptimal-result cases inflicts unjustified
disadvantages when she adheres. But one who deviates consistently in suboptimal-result cases is
either complicit in the harm of excessive collective deviation, if others also deviate excessively,
or else she rides free on judges who deviate less frequently than she. If wrongdoing must be
done, then it should be distributed as evenly as possible across moral agents.
Therefore, Jack has a strong reason not to follow a policy of consistent deviation in
suboptimal-result cases, regardless of how other judges act. If they deviate consistently, then
Jack has a strong reason not to do so, in order to avoid complicity. If they don't deviate
consistently, then Jack still has a strong reason not to do so, in order to avoid free riding.
I can now explain the moral difference between the judicial oath and Bruce's oath to kick
his dog. When Jack takes the oath, he becomes a participant in the collective judicial enterprise.
As such, he is now someone whose deviant decisions participate in a decision pattern that has
negative systemic effects, or else he rides free on other judges. To this extent, his oath
constitutes a reason for him to adhere, but it does so only in virtue of making him a participant in
the judicial enterprise. This is the condition that enables his oath to constitute a reason to adhere
to the law.
By contrast, Bruce's oath does not transform him into a participant in any collective
enterprise. If he breaks his oath by failing to kick his dog, his failure does not contribute to an
enterprise with negative systemic effects. Therefore, Bruce's oath gives him no reason to kick
his dog.
...