If A and B disagree about $p$ (knowingly) and A does not have [enough] reason to think B is [sufficiently] more likely to have made a mistake about $p$, then A does not have enough justification to know that $p$ is true.

**When should A see B as reliable (about $p$)?**

1. *Mistrust by default?*
   - If A has no evidence that B is reliable about $p$, then A is justified in believing that B is unreliable about $p$ and not justified in believing that B is reliable about $p$;
   - and if A has [enough] evidence that B is reliable about $p$, then A is not justified in believing that B is unreliable about $p$.

2. *Trust by default?*
   - If A has no evidence that B is unreliable about $p$, then A is justified in believing that B is reliable about $p$ and not justified in believing that B is unreliable about $p$;
   - and if A has [enough] evidence that B is unreliable about $p$, then A is not justified in believing that B is reliable about $p$.

3. *A mixed view?*
   - Should we default to trust for beliefs about some topics, and mistrust for beliefs about other topics? Which?
Expertise

Let’s say someone is an “x expert” if their beliefs about x are reliable, and more reliable than those of typical people.

4. Are there moral experts? Can they be recognized by non-experts? If so, how?

5. Is theistic expertise more or less plausible than moral expertise? Why?