Question: When should we trust by default, and when should we mistrust by default?

Question: Are there cases in which disagreement about \( p \) should not defeat all the justification \( A \) has to believe \( B \), even if \( B \) is \( A \)'s epistemic equal?

- Does this vary from topic to topic?
  - i.e. we should default to trust beliefs about topic \( x \) by default, but default to mistrust beliefs about topic \( y \)
  - i.e. disagreement about topic \( x \) is a defeater, but disagreement about topic \( y \) is not

- Does it vary depending on how the beliefs were formed?
  - i.e. we should trust beliefs formed using process \( x \) by default, but default to mistrusting beliefs formed using process \( y \)
  - i.e. when we formed beliefs using process \( x \), disagreement is not a defeater, but when we formed beliefs using process \( y \), disagreement is

- Some combination of the above?
  - For certain topics, we should trust certain mental processes by default and not trust other processes by default, but for other topics we should default-trust different processes

- Something else?

**Some views**

*inferential beliefs:* beliefs based on conscious reasoning processes
*experiential beliefs:* the believer has an experience which represents \( p \) as true and directly believes \( p \)

1. All experiential beliefs are to be default trusted, but all inferential beliefs are to be default mistrusted.

2. All experiential beliefs are to be default trusted; all inferential beliefs about [ … ] are to be default mistrusted; all other inferential beliefs are to be default trusted.
3. Whenever A and B disagree about the truth of a belief that is experiential for both of them, this is defeater, but whenever A and B disagree about the truth of an inferential belief, this is not a defeater.

McGrath’s view
4. McGrath says that there are no detectable moral experts. Which of these seems like a more plausible version of that claim, and why:
   • We cannot determine whose experiential moral beliefs are more reliable.
   • We cannot determine whose inferential moral beliefs are more reliable.

Zagzebski’s view (?)
5. All beliefs formed by admired people should be trusted by default, and all beliefs not formed by admired people should be mistrusted by default.
6. All beliefs formed via admired processes should be trusted by default, all beliefs not formed by admired processes should be mistrusted by default.
7. All beliefs formed by people/processes that are not disadmired should be trusted by default, and all beliefs formed by disadmired people/processes should be mistrusted by default.